The use of role engineering has grown in importance with the expansion of highly abstracted access control frameworks in organizations. In particular, the use of role mining techniques for the discovery of roles from previously deployed authorizations has facilitated the configuration of such frameworks. However, the literature lacks from a clear basis for appraising and leveraging the learning outcomes of the role mining process. In this paper, we provide such a formal basis. We compare sets of roles by projecting roles from one set into the other set. This approach is useful to measure how comparable the two configurations of roles are, and to interpret each role. We formally define the problem of comparing sets of roles, and prove that the problem is NP-complete. Then, we propose an algorithm to map the inherent relationship between the sets based on boolean expressions. We demonstrate the correctness and completeness of our solution, and investigate some further issues that may benefit from our approach, such as detection of unhandled perturbations or source misconfiguration. In particular, we emphasize that the presence of shadowed roles in the role configuration increases the time complexity of sets of roles comparison. We provide a definition of the shadowed roles problem and propose a solution that detects di↵erent cases of role shadowing.
Introduction
Access control is a security fundamental concern which covers a wide area of applications including operating systems, database systems, enterprise resource planning systems, and workflow systems. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [1] [2] is the dominant model for access control in both commercial and research fields. It structures into roles the concrete agents who have access requirements to secured objects, such as employees, programs, or processors.
A role can be viewed from two perspectives: a set of authorizations that are recurrently assigned together, or a set of agents that are granted the same set of authorizations. As RBAC platforms have become essential to large enterprises, the major di culty is still the configuration and establishment of the RBAC model in the organization.
Role engineering is the practical discipline of implementing the RBAC model into organizations. Essentially, role engineering is the process of structuring the di↵erent agents of an organization into roles, and the association of the corresponding set of authorizations to every role. Top-down and bottom-up are the two common strategies in order to apply role engineering. Under the topdown approach, the roles are defined by carefully analyzing the business process associated with the organization, and decomposing it into smaller units in a functionally independent manner. Under the bottom-up approach, roles emerge from existing configurations of authorizations already deployed over the organization. The role engineering task is extremely time consuming and costly [3] . For this reason, the use of 'automatic' bottom-up role engineering techniques is growing in importance. These techniques get inspiration from data mining techniques, hence, they are known as r ole mining (RM). Several e cient role mining algorithms have been proposed in the literature [4] . However, they still require intensive human interpretation before leading to appropriate results. To the best of our knowledge, no e cient solutions have been proposed to assist a security administrator in the task of leveraging the outcomes of a role mining process. Moreover, as the years elapse since the wide adoption of RBAC in organizations, a new requirement is strongly emerging. In addition to the traditional application of role engineering upon organizations where there is only a direct user-permission assignment framework, we may also need to apply role engineering in organizations where a pre-existing RBAC configuration exists but is no longer optimized. This may happen because the RBAC configuration is getting old and recurrently updated, or does not fit the dynamic nature of the organization anymore. In such cases, keeping as close as possible to the original RBAC configuration is the proper optimization criteria of existing role mining strategies [5] . In this regard, the ability of mapping the outcomes of a role mining process to the set of original authorizations may be highly beneficial in order to understand and validate the discovery process, as well as to detect unhandled perturbations over the deployed configurations, or misconfiguration within the original ones. Similarly, we also rise the necessity of comparing the outcomes of two di↵erent role mining processes. Indeed, several role mining tools have been proposed in the literature. Each new role mining technique needs to be tested and evaluated before being released and used in real configurations. The test stage usually consists of running the role mining algorithm on real and synthetic concrete data, generated from already known consistent RBAC state. The RBAC state obtained from the role mining is then compared to the original RBAC state, in a reverse engineering manner. However, we do not find any analytic comparison tool between two RBAC configurations of roles in the literature. Thus, an automatic matching tool between roles from two sets is obviously needed, either for the assessment of the role mining methods, or for the interpretation of the mined roles.
In this paper, we formally define the problem of comparing two sets of roles according to the underlined requirements extracted from the literature. We demonstrate that the problem is NP-complete. We present a greedy solution that handles the motivation problem. Then, we prove the correctness and completeness of the solution. We define a su cient condition that guarantees preciseness of the comparison between the original set of roles and mined set of roles. The experimental results confirm the validity of our approach, as a beneficial solution to analyze and better understand the set of mined roles when an original set of roles exists. Paper organization. Section 2 reviews some technical definitions about the RBAC model and role mining problem and its algebraic representation. Section 3 presents the use cases considered in this paper, introduces an example of motivation, and provides a comparison with related work. Section 4 formally defines the problem to solve. Section 5 presents our solution to the problem, underlines some of the properties of our solution, and elaborates on some heuristics to enhance our approach. Section 6 presents the shadowed roles problem, links it with the role set comparison problem, and proposes an algorithm for shadowing detection. Section 7 presents experimental results. Section 8 concludes the paper.
This paper is an extended version of the previous work presented at ARES 2012 [6] . In particular, the motivation use cases has been emphasized and illustrated by an example in Section 3. The algorithmic complexity evaluation in Section 5 has been revised and enhanced by the proposition of a Heuristic. Section 6 has been added to handle the shadowed roles problem. Section 7 has been upgraded with experimental results of tests with the shadowing detection algorithm introduced in section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present the background on the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model. In addition, we state a formulation of the role mining problem, and introduce the algebraic presentation of the involved data in role mining.
Role Based Access Control Model
The RBAC model is a NIST standard [2] . It introduces the notion of "role" in order to make the access control system more compact and comprehensive, compared to the direct user-permission assignments. Definition 1 presents the basic model RBAC 0 [2] without considering sessions. Definition 1. RBAC An RBAC configuration, denoted as RC = (ROLES, UR, RP ), is characterized by:
• U , ROLES, OPS, and OBJ , which are the sets of users, roles, operations, and objects
• UR ✓ U ⇥ ROLES, a many-to-many mapping user-to-role assignment relation
• PRMS ✓ {(op, obj)|op 2 OPS^obj 2 OBJ }, a set of permissions, where a permission is an operation over an object
• RP ✓ ROLES ⇥ PRMS, a many-to-many mapping of user-to-permission assignment relation
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• assigned users(R) = {u 2 U |(u, R) 2 UR}, the mapping of role R onto a set of users
• assigned permissions(R) = {p 2 PRMS|(R, p) 2 RP }, the mapping of role R onto a set of permissions
The Role Mining Problem
Intuitively, role mining is the process of extracting a configuration of roles from a discretionary user permission assignment relation. The users granted with similar permissions are structured into similar roles. Symmetrically, permissions with common users are assigned together, so that they belong to the same roles. Optionally, some information about the business process or the user attributes may be provided, and the is called a hybrid role mining. Nevertheless, there is no consensus about the formal role mining problem definition. Several role mining techniques are proposed in the literature, with di↵erent assumptions and optimization criteria leading to di↵erent solutions. For instance, the first explicit formal definition for the role mining problem is given in [7] . Vaidya et al. suggest the minimization of the number of generated roles as an optimization criteria, and show that this problem is NP-complete. The inference role mining problem presented by Frank et al. [8] focuses on the problem from a general perspective. In all cases, role mining assumes implicitly that an underlying RBAC configuration exists in the deployed authorizations, and aims to reveal this underlying configuration.
Definition 2. Inference Role Mining Problem
Let U be a set of users, PRMS a set of permissions, UPA a user-permission assignment relation, and, optionally, part of the top-down information TDI be given. Infer the unknown RBAC configuration RC ⇤ = (ROLES ⇤ , UR ⇤ , RP ⇤ ), under the following assumptions:
1. An underlying RBAC configuration exists 2. Exceptions (may) exist 3. TDI (if given) influences RC ⇤ .
Definition 2 provides a unified view of both bottom-up and hybrid role mining. Unlike other definitions, it does not give the function to optimize, i.e. the precise way to solve the problem. Therefore, to validate that the problem is solved, we must know the underlying RBAC configuration RC ⇤ . We can compare the set of mined roles with the set of original roles in experimental scenarios, as well as in application scenarios where an old RBAC configuration exists.
Algebraic Representation of the Problem. To unify the representation of the inputs and outputs of role mining, the involved entities are represented with boolean matrices as follows: given m users, n permissions and k roles (i.e., |U | = m, |PRMS| = n, |ROLES| = k), the user-to-role mapping UR is represented as an m ⇥ k matrix where 1 in cell {ij} indicates the assignment of role j to user i. Similarly, the role-to-permission mapping RP is represented as a k ⇥ n matrix where 1 in cell {ij} indicates the assignment of permission j to role i. Finally, the user-to-permission mapping UPA is represented as an m ⇥ n matrix where 1 in cell {ij} indicates the assignment of permission j to user i. The relationship between UPA, UR and RP can be expressed with the boolean matrix multiplication.
Definition 3. Boolean Matrix Multiplication
A Boolean matrix multiplication between Boolean matrices A 2 {0, 1} n⇥k and
In an RBAC configuration, we have UPA = UR ⌦ RP . A user i is granted permission j if, at least, one of its roles is assigned to this permission. The role mining process approximates the above decomposition by extracting from a given UPA the relations UR ⇤ and RP ⇤ such that: UPA ⇡ UR ⇤ ⌦ RP ⇤ .
Motivation

Use Cases for Comparing Two Sets of Roles
The requirement for comparing two sets of roles occurs in several use cases related to role mining. The first use case is the assessment of role mining algorithms. An algorithm designer usually evaluates the performance of its RM algorithm with the reverse engineering technique: starting from an RBAC configuration, apply role mining over the resulting UPA, and compare the obtained roles with the original roles. Likewise, we can compare the outputs of several role mining algorithms to test their performance under di↵erent constraints. The second use case is the enforcement of role mining results. A security administrator can require assistance toward migrating to a new RBAC configuration from an old RBAC configuration. A similar application is migrating from discretionary UPA to an RBAC configuration. Considering the set of permissions of each user as a pseudo-role, the administrator may need assistance to assign each user to the appropriate roles which guarantee the required permissions. A mapping of the pseudo-roles with the obtained new RBAC roles may solve the problem.
In almost all the above mentioned cases, we have typically a set of roles of reference or original roles OR and a set of mined roles MR. The first set is a set of mastered roles since they are well known by the security administrator, in opposition to the set of new roles MR. The two configurations of roles are defined for the same set of discretionary security rules UPA. However, they may have been calculated with respect to di↵erent constraints. For instance, one set can correspond to a hierarchical structure of roles whereas the other is flat. Similarly, the roles of one set may be partially overlapping whereas the roles of the other set are orthogonal.
Role mining algorithms usually output a list of roles, possibly overlapping or even redundant which means that a role can be fully covered by a union of a subset of other roles from the same list. When migrating to a new RBAC configuration, the security administrator is confronted to such a list of new roles, and he has to assign them to the users and manage them to suit the organization's evolutive requirements. The administrator has to respect three access control rules: provisioning, security and maintainability. For provisioning, each user should have access in the new configuration of roles to all its privileges in the old one. For that, the administrator needs to know how to optimally cover the permissions provided by each role from OR using roles from MR. Security consists of not allowing any user to access extra-privileges. For this purpose, the administrator needs to ensure that the new assigned roles to the users do not exceed the privileges provided by their old roles. Finally, the maintainability aims to make simple and safe the evolution of the structure of roles by adding and retrieving permissions and users to the roles, according to the evolving requirements of the organization. One key characteristic to ensure the maintainability is mastering the configuration of roles. Thus, the security administrator, who masters the old roles or the old UPA, would be very interested in leveraging his experience with the old roles in order to master the new configuration of roles more quickly. Unfortunately, mapping the new roles with the old ones manually is not a viable task. It is essential then to assist the security administrator with automated tools to analytically understand the new roles. In particular, assistance is needed to find where the permissions of an old role has been distributed in the new configuration of roles, especially when moving between a flat role structure and a hierarchical role structure. In addition, such tool may help to find how to optimally assign the permissions to the users without adding extra-permissions using the new roles.
Motivating Example
We provide the following motivation example to illustrate the problems handled in the paper. Table 1 shows two equivalent RBAC configurations of a hypothetical financial department of an organization. They could be an old and a new representations of a subset of the Access Control policy of the organization. We imagine the following scenario. At some point of time, security experts have defined the set of original roles in OR (see Table 1 (a)). In this repartition of roles, they have planned that any employee of the organization who needs to make a purchase has to contact an employee from the financial department, who will create a purchase-order. Some employees in the department are in charge of reading all the existing purchase-orders and deciding to create cash transfers for the relevant orders according to their priority. An employee with higher responsibility has a reading access to all the purchase-orders and must validate the cash transfers before they become e↵ective. We suppose that after some time, the progress in the sta ng of the organization has leaded to the user to role assignments in UR1(see Table 1 (c)). In the terminology of the RBAC Definition 2.1, the operations are OPS = {create (c ), read (r ), validate (v)} and the objects are OBJ ={purchase-order (p-Order), cash transfer (Trans)}. The set of permissions is then: PRMS = {cTrans, rP-order, cP-order, vTrans}. The first set of roles is Original ROLES ={ Handle Order(r1), Create Order(r2), Supervise Transfer(r3)}. The combination of the role-to-permission and the user-to-roles relations OR and UR1 gives the user-to-permission access control relation UPA (see Table 1 (e)): UR1⌦OR = UPA.
If we focus on the user-to-role assignment in the original RBAC configuration UR1(in Table 1 (c)), we notice that r1 and r2 are always assigned to the users together, and that r3 is always assigned to the users with r1 and r2 which means that the permission p3 in r3 does not have any impact on the UPA since it is also provided by r2 to the same user. These remarks may warn that the old configuration of roles is no more suitable to the new policy of access control and to the current distribution of responsibilities over the employees. In our scenario, we suppose that security administrator has decided to apply some role mining technique on the current UPA matrix (see Table 1 (e)), and has obtained a new RBAC configuration with the new set of roles MR (see Tab 1(b)). The set of mined roles is Mined ROLES ={ Manage Order(R1), Validate Transfer(R2)}. It contains only two non overlapping roles R1 and R2.
The new user to role assignment relation is UR2 (in Table 1 (d)). Actually, most of role mining techniques calculate only the Role to permission matrix RP2 and the security administrator has to assign the users to the new roles manually to get UR2.
The two RBAC configurations in Table 1 are such that: UR2⌦OR = UR1⌦OR = UPA, which means that the two sets of roles are equivalent according to the following definition.
Definition 4. Equivalent Sets Of Roles
Two sets of roles RP1 and RP2 are equivalent if they may lead to a same User-to-Permission-Assignment relation UPA i.e. there exists two respective User-to-Role matrices UR1 and UR2 for RP1 and RP2 such that UR1 ⌦ RP 1 = UR2 ⌦ RP 2 = UPA;
In order to understand and analyze the new set of roles, and to assign the users to the new roles, the security administrator needs to compare the mined roles with the original roles that he used to control. Comparing the mined roles to the original roles should reveal that R1 is the combination of r1 and r2, i.e. R1 = r1 [ r2 and that R2 is r3 minus the permission p2 that was shadowed in RP1, since it is also assigned through the role r1, so R2 = r3 \ ¬r1. It is easy to establish manually such a relationship between the old roles and the new roles in a simple example like in Table 1 , but in real life applications, it is very hard to handle a large number of roles manually, and automatic solutions are required to perform this task. However, the existing solutions in literature are unable to find a satisfactory comparison between two sets of roles.
Related Work
Research on role mining has revealed di↵erent requirements for the comparison of roles. Several propositions in this field have been presented.
In [9] , Kuhlmann et al. address the problem by counting how many of the roles lying in the original reference set are exactly the same as those discovered by their proposed role mining method. Similarly, Vaidya et al. in [10] consider the average, instead of the total number, of original roles that are exactly discovered by their role mining technique, as an evaluation metric for role mining.
Thus, their metric provides means to compare di↵erent role mining approaches, being not influenced by the number of roles, and giving a similarity of one for total coincidence, and zero for total di↵erence. The main drawback of these two first metrics is that they discard roles that are very similar but not exactly the same as roles in the original role set. For instance, if we compare the two sets of roles OR and MR presented in the previous example (Table 1) using either the method in [9] or [10] , and since none of the original roles has been discovered by the role mining algorithm, we will obtain Similarity(OR,MR) = 0, which suggests that the two sets of roles are not comparable, whereas they are equivalent actually.
Hassan Takabi et al. in [11] , consider the case in which an initial RBAC configuration is upgraded during the role mining process. The similarity between roles is one of the two optimization criteria used by their role mining approach, the minimality of the resulting number of roles being the second criteria. In order to address similar issues, Vaidya et al. propose in [5] a series of similarity and dissimilarity metrics based on the Jaccard Coe cient and Jaccard Distance 2 . Their metrics have been recurrently used in the literature to compare roles and sets of roles; and to evaluate role mining algorithms [4] . Applied to our motivation example, Similarity(MR,OR)= (Jacc(R1, r1) + Jacc(R2, r3))/2 = (0.66 + 0.5 )/2 = 0.58. However, these Jaccard-based measurements still su↵er from several important limitations. First, it computes role similarity for one role from one set with respect to only one role in the compared set. In the motivation example, we get Jacc(R1,r1) = 0.66 whereas it would be more accurate to calculate Jacc(R1, r1 [ r2) = 1. Second, the same role may be used to be compared with several roles from the other set. Thus, as a quality performance criteria, it may artificially be a↵ected by reference sets with a high number of closely similar roles. For instance, if we suppose that the role mining algorithm has produced another role R3 = {p1, p2, p4}, the similarity becomes Similarity(MR,OR) = (Jacc(R1,r1) + Jacc(R2,r3) + Jacc(R3,r1))/3 = 0.61>0.58. Thus, the role r2 is used twice, and the similarity metric is enhanced by the role R3 that is not useful at all.
Alternatively, P. Streich et al. [12] propose a one-to-one matching for the comparison of two sets, based on the average Hamming distance 3 . Their method outputs a single permutation of all roles for the second set, that gives a oneto-one mapping between the same number of roles kept in the first set. This avoids the drawback of the previous proposition of mapping independently many discovered roles to the same original role. However, the method is not specifically designed for role mining applications, but for clustering in general. We think 2 The Jaccard Coe cient and the Jaccard Distance are well-known measurements on the asymmetric information field. For non-binary data, the Jaccard Coe cient corresponds to JC AB = |A\B| |A[B| , and the Jaccard Distance to JD AB = 1 JC AB . 3 The Hamming distance between two vectors of n elements from an alphabet A: a = (a i ) i2 [1,n] and b = (b i ) i2 [1,n] is the number of elements in a that are di↵erent from the elements in b at the same positions: Hamming Distance(a, b) = |{i, a i 6 = b i }| .
that the Hamming distance is not appropriate for role-to-role distance measure. In fact, it does not take into account the similarity of the roles, but only the di↵erence (e.g., Hamming(r2,R1) = Hamming(r2,R2) = 2; but in reality r2 shares a permission with R1 and has nothing to do with R2).
More recently, Molloy et al. [13] has proposed a one-to-one mapping between the roles from two sets, also based on the Jaccard Coe cient. In order to evaluate the role stability in the presence of noise as defined in [14] , they compare the two sets of roles generated by role mining over noisy data, and clean data. They assimilate the role mapping problem to a bipartite matching optimization problem known as The Minimum Weighted Bipartite Matching Problem (MWBM). Given two sets of roles SR1 and SR2, they create one vertex in V1 for each role in SR1 and one vertex in V2 for each role in SR2. For each pair of roles (R1,R2), such that R1 is included in V1, and R2 is included in V2, they add an edge (R1,R2) with weight Jaccard(R1,R2). Then, they run an algorithm solving the maximum weighted bipartite matching problem. The solution contains the closest pairwise matching by maximizing the global similarity metric. Each role in SR1 is matched with only one role in SR2, such that the sum of the distances is minimized. Finally, the metric is the sum of the distances between the matched roles. Applied to the motivation example proposed in section 3.2, this method will match the role R1 with r1 and R2 with r3, with a similarity metric value of 0.58. This method has addressed the problem of matching the same role in one set several times while other interesting roles are discarded. But the similarity measure is still straightforward. In general, we may wish to define similarity between sets of roles in a much more sophisticated fashion. For example, note that all the above measures still assume that a role can only be mapped to another role. Usually, this is not true. For instance, in the motivation example, it would be much more interesting for a security administrator to know that R1 is the union of r1 and r2, and that R2 is equal to r3 minus the permission shared with r1.
The previous work only focuses on the issue of comparing two sets of roles from the perspective of finding a similarity metric for the assessment of a set of roles with reference to another set of roles, and do not care about providing assistance to the administrator to analyze and leverage role mining results. In this paper, we consider the problem of comparing two sets of roles from a new perspective. Our approach allows a semantic analysis of the resulting set of mined roles in comparison with the preexisting set of roles, and the detection of misconfiguration of roles. We provide a tool that can assist a security administrator in the comprehension of the mined roles and how to enforce them.
Role Set Comparison Problem
We propose a new approach to the problem of comparing two sets of roles. Our approach targets to leverage all the relationships between roles from the two sets: merged roles, partitioned roles, hierarchical relationships, exceptions, etc. These relationships allow to analytically understand the new set of roles while leveraging the experience with the set of roles of reference. Our method to reach this target is to express each role from one set as an algebraic formula of the roles from the other set. We find that the Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) is a natural choice to structure this formula.
Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this paper is formally stated as follows:
Given two sets of roles OR and MR, both defined onto the same set of permissions PRMS, find for each role R in OR a minimal Disjunctive Normal Form DNF of roles in MR, such that DNF is included in R, and DNF maximally covers the permissions of R. By minimal DNF we mean that the size then the number of conjunctive clauses in the DNF are minimized.
Definition 5 proposes to express each role from OR with an algebraic formula of mined roles. The formula is presented as a disjunction of conjunctions of mined roles, i.e. a Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) expression. The structure of a DNF fits naturally the requirement of projecting a role R from OR in MR. The permissions of the role R are divided into several roles in MR or gathered with other roles in a larger role, or both. Thus R may be expressed by a combination of unions of roles and/or intersections of roles. The conjunctions express hierarchical relationships: when the role R becomes an intersection of roles in the new configuration MR, this means that the projection in MR of R or of a subset of it is a super role. Moreover, the use of negation of roles in combination with conjunction aims to retrieve a role from a role expressing exceptions. The disjunctions accumulate and cover the permissions of R when they are spread in MR. The problem also states that the DNF should still be included in R. This condition guarantees the security rule, and avoid assigning extra-privileges to the users. Symmetrically, the problem states that the coverage of the permissions should be maximized since the purpose is to understand the projection of the role in the new configuration. This is an approximation problem since the exact DNF can not always be found because of role mining errors, exceptions and shadowed roles. This issue is handled in the next section more in depth. The existence of the exact DNF matching, and the complexity of the DNF, are good indications about whether the two sets of roles are comparable or not. Besides, there may be di↵erent possibilities of DNF from MR to maximally cover a given role R. In such case, we find the DNF which involves less conjunctions of roles in order to reduce the size of the obtained hierarchical relationships. In a second stage, we also minimize the number of clauses. Finally, we note that the comparison is intended to be from original roles to mined roles, but it obviously can be done in the opposite way.
Complexity
We demonstrate that the problem stated in Definition 5 is NP-complete. We first decompose the problem considering the comparison of one role to a set of roles, and then we reformulate it as a decision problem, in order to apply the NP Completeness theory.
Definition 6. Role-to-Role Set Comparison Decision Problem Given a role R and a set of roles MR, defined onto the same set of permissions PRMS, and given two integers k and l, is there a Disjunctive Normal Form DNF of roles from MR, with less than l literals per clause and less than k clauses, such that DNF equals R?
To prove that the problem is NP-complete, we show that:
1. The problem is NP. 2. There exists another known NP-complete problem, any instance of which can be reduced in a polynomial time to an instance of our problem, such that resolving our problem infers resolving the other problem.
Definition 7. Set Covering Problem Given a universe U , a family of subsets S of U and an integer k. A cover is a subfamily C ✓ S of sets whose union is U . Is there a cover of size at most k?
Proof. First, the problem is NP since checking the validity of a solution, i.e. calculating the set of permissions of a DNF and comparing it with R and counting the number of clauses and the number of literals in each clause, can be done in polynomial time. Second, the set covering problem can be reduced to our problem. The universe U is assimilated to the role R. The family of subsets S is projected to the set of roles MR, which are sets of permissions. The size of the cover k is the same as the size of the DNF k, and we set l to 1. We get a special case of the Role-to-Role Set Comparison Problem, where all the roles of MR are included in R. Resolving this instance of the Role-to-Role Set Comparison Problem implies finding a DNF in MR, that maximally covers R with the minimal number of clauses and no conjunction at all. It infers finding a minimal cover for the universe U in S if such a cover exists. The transformation is obviously polynomial since it is a one to one mapping.
Role Set Comparison Solution
In this section we provide an algorithm to solve the Role Set Comparison Problem. Afterwards, we analyze some important properties of our algorithm, and show its relevance in the context of role mining.
The Algorithm
Algorithm 1 is a greedy algorithm which solves the Role Set Comparison Problem. The algorithm takes as input two sets of roles, and gives as output, for each role R in the first set setR1, an algebraic expression formulated as a generalized union of intersections of roles taken in the second set of roles setR2 and their negations. The obtained expression, denoted DNF, is equal to R if any possibility to construct such an expression exists among setR2. Otherwise, it is the best approximation of R included in it while ¬RIsCovered and CandidateClauses 6 = ; do 10:
for each clause C in CandidateClauses do
11:
if ¬RIsCovered then
12:
if C ✓ R then 13: if C \ UncoveredPerms 6 = ; then for each clause C' in DNF do
20:
if C' ⇢ (DNF -C') then
21:
remove C' from DNF The universe of literals which can be used to build the DNF is CandidateRoles, containing all the roles in setR2 in addition to the negation of each
for each clause C' in GeneratedClauses do 
Running Example
We consider the configurations of roles in Table 2 . We run the Algorithm 1 with the inputs (MR,OR).
Algorithm 1 projects the roles R1 and R2 in the set of roles OR sequentially. We handle only on the projection of role R1in this demonstration, thus, we Original
will run the main for loop (line 2-35) only one time. So we focus on the rest of Algorithm 1. First of all, the candidate literals are CandidateRoles = {r1, r2, r3, ¬r1, ¬r2, ¬r3} (line 1). After the initialization step (line 3-8), we get: UncoveredPerms = R; DNF = {}; CandidateClauses = CandidateRoles; DiscardedClauses = {}; RIsCovered = False; and ConjunctiveClauseLevel = 1, which means that we will first try to cover R using disjunctions of roles from setR2. In the first iteration of the while loop (line 9-33) of Algorithm 1:
We enter the for loop (line 10-28) which tests the clauses in CandidateClauses one by one. Only the clause r1 is included in R, and satisfies the conditions of line 12 and line 13. Thus, {r1} is added to DNF, and UncoveredPerms is updated to {p5, p6, p7} (line [14] [15] . At the end of the for loop (line 10-28), since the value of RIsCovered is still False, the number of literals per clause ConjunctiveClauseLevel is increased to 2, meaning that we will test the clauses of disjunctions of two literals next. Algorithm 2 is called to generate a new set of clauses (line 30-31) . The result of this call is CandidateClauses={r2 \ r3, r2 \ ¬r1, r2 \ ¬r3, r3 \ ¬r1, r3 \ ¬r2, ¬r1 \ ¬r2, ¬r1 \ ¬r3, ¬r2 \ ¬r3}. It is all the combinations of conjunction of two roles from CandidateRoles, minus the clauses involving DiscardedClauses. We notice that r1 does not take part in any of the candidate clauses, since it is a discarded clause now. We also exclude the clauses involving a role and its negation because it is the empty set. In the second iteration of the while loop (line 9-33) of Algorithm 1: the for loop (line 10-28) tests the new set of CandidateClauses one by one again. The first clause to pass the test in line 12 (inclusion in R) is r3 \ ¬r2. This clause covers all the remaining UncoveredPerms. So DNF is updated to {{r1}, {r3, ¬r2}} which is interpreted: DNF = r1 [ (r3 \ ¬r2). UncoveredPerms is updated to ; (line 15), and so RIsCovered is set to true (line 17). The for loop (line 19-23) checks that the new added clause does not cover the previously added clauses to DNF, in order to remove the obsolete clauses. There will be no further loops and no further generation of clauses of conjunction of higher number of literals because RIsCovered is set to true.
Properties of Algorithm 1
Theorem 2. Correctness. For each role R in OR, the returned DNF is included or equal to R.
Proof. Lines 12 and 13 of Algorithm 1 guarantee that the DNF is always a subset of or equal to R. A Similarity Metric. The result of Algorithm 1 can be leveraged to obtain a similarity metric between two sets of roles. Indeed, we can sum the distances between each role from setR1 and its DNF in setR2, and then divide the sum by the number of roles in setR1 to get the distance between the two sets of roles:
and
It should be noted that this similarity metric is not a 'metric' in the mathematical sense because it does not fill the symmetry property. Indeed, we can have similarity(setR1, setR2) 6 = similarity(setR2, setR1). Still, the obtained distance is a good indicator of how well the setR1 is represented in the setR2, and may be considered as more accurate than the metrics presented in the related work.
Time Complexity of Algorithm 1
The time complexity of Algorithm 1 depends on both the size and the nature of the input data. If the inputs are two sets of roles of size n and m respectively, then the worst case complexity is O(n ⇥ 4 m ). The worst case is when the two sets of roles are not comparable, meaning that for each role in setR1 there exist no DNF of roles from setR2 that exactly matches with it. The algorithm will test, for each of the n roles of the first set, all the possible configurations of disjunction of conjunction of the m roles in setR2, increasing gradually the number of roles in the conjunction from one to 2m, and the outputted DNFs will be only approximations of the roles. Thus, we calculate the worst case
The best case complexity is O(n ⇥ 2m), when the two sets of roles are identical. In such case, for each of the n roles from the first set, Algorithm 1 glances through the set of m roles and their negations only once and finds the exact match. We note that the complexity is independent from the number of permissions and users.
Heuristic to Reduce the Complexity
Algorithm 1 solves an NP-complete problem. The worst case time complexity is high. However, more than the size of the input data, the time complexity depends on the nature of this data. Indeed, the complexity is exponential on the number of roles from the second set when the compared sets of roles are incomparable, whereas the complexity is much lower when the sets of roles are comparable. Since we intend to use the algorithm in a context of role mining where the roles are comparable, we expect that the exact matching for each role exists and will be found. In addition, it will be generally found at a low level of ConjunctiveClauseLevel. Otherwise, we can guess that no matching DNF can be found for the handled role, and stop exploring further combinations of roles prematurely. An intuitive heuristic to reduce the time complexity of the algorithm is to set a limit for the ConjunctiveClauseLevel. We provide the possibility for the user of the algorithm to set a threshold, in order to avoid that the algorithm explores all the combinations involving clauses of cardinality beyond this threshold. Besides, such option may be required by the user. Indeed, a security administrator may prefer that the obtained DNFs keep simple and short for easier management than more complex and accurate. The threshold can be given as input to the algorithm and taken into account with a minor modification of Algorithm 1 by adding the condition (ConjunctiveLevel  threshold) to the line 9. Algorithm 3 is a new version of Algorithm 1 where we show only the modified lines. To enhance the accuracy of matching between each role and its approximated DNF, the user can increase the threshold gradually.
For n mined roles, m original roles, and a threshold t of the maximal number of roles in a conjunction, the worst case complexity becomes O(n ⇥
The heuristic slightly decreases the execution time since t will Algorithm 3 Compare(setR1,setR2,threshold) Input: nRoles1⇥nPerms reference role-permission relation setR1 Input: nRoles2⇥nPerms compared role-permission relation setR2 Input: threshold is an integer that represents the maximum supported number of roles in a conjunctive clause in the returned DNF Output: a DNF of roles from setR2 for each role in setR1. The DNF is equal to the role, or the closest included possible, with no more than threshold roles in each conjunctive clause of the DNF. . . . 9: while ¬RIsCovered and CandidateClauses 6 = ; and ConjunctiveClauseLevel  threshold . . . 35: return DNF for role R be generally set much lower than m, and the complexity is still high. But this heuristic is applicable in the general case, to any sets of roles provided as input.
To enhance the time complexity more significantly, we have to focus on the input data characteristics. We have to formally study the notion of comparable sets of roles, and its impact on the time complexity of the algorithm. In particular, since our intended context of application is role mining, we need to characterize more specifically the use cases related with role mining, where the exact match DNFs could or could not be found. Then we will be able to preprocess the input data accordingly, with the objective to avoid providing roles with no exact match DNFs to Algorithm 1. This approach is detailed in the following section.
Shadowed Roles Detection
In this section, we first investigate the characteristics of the input data and their impact on Algorithm 1 of role set comparison. We characterize, under realistic assumptions related to role mining context, some properties of roles that guarantee the existence of the exact matching DNFs. We demonstrate that there is a correlation between the misconfiguration problem of shadowed roles and the complexity of execution of Algorithm 1. Second, we focus on shadowed roles detection as a standalone problem. We provide a definition of the problem of shadowing. Finally we propose an algorithm that detects and reports shadowed roles in a given configuration of roles.
Detecting Shadowed Roles with the Role Set Comparison Algorithm
Based on our analysis of the the time complexity of the Algorithm 1, the execution time is expected to be low when the exact matching DNFs exists for all the roles. We are interested in characterizing the input data properties that guarantee the existence of the exact matching DNFs. Besides, though Algorithm 1 can compare two arbitrary sets of roles defined over the same set of permissions, it is intended to be used in the context of role mining. Hence, we focus on the cases related to role mining, where the two sets of roles provided as input to Algorithm 1 are equivalent. Proof. Since the two configurations of roles are equivalent according to Definition 4 , the k users which have exactly the permissions of the role R in common, must have exactly the same permissions in the two equivalent RBAC configurations. Let the roles assigned to user U i in RP2 be referred as r ij , j from 1 to l i , where l i is the number of roles assigned to the user U i in RP2. Then we have: assigned perms(
R is the intersection of the permissions of the users U i , i from 1 to k, thus it can be denoted R = assigned perms(U i ) = R) a DNF of roles from the other set which exactly matches with it. We note that this condition is independent of the role mining technique used to calculate the sets of roles. Moreover, this condition is closely related with the concept of role. Indeed, a role can be viewed as a set of permissions assigned together to a set of users.
The following corollary states that the aforementioned condition is satisfied by the roles belonging to a non overlapping configuration of roles: Corollary 1. Completeness Guarantees for Non Overlapping Roles. Given two "equivalent" sets of roles RP1 and RP2; If the roles of the set RP1 are not overlapping, then, for any role R in RP1, if R is assigned at least to a user, and there is no other role R 0 2 RP1 such that assigned users(R) ✓ assigned users(R 0 ), there exists at least a Disjunctive Normal Form DNF of roles from RP2 that exactly matches with R.
Proof. reductio ad absurdum: Assume that \
Ui2assigned users(R)
assigned perms(U i ) = R [ P with P a set of permissions such that P \ R = ; and P 6 = ;. Then P is the intersection of the permissions assigned to all the roles assigned to the users assigned to R, minus the permissions assigned to R.
However, there is no role shared by all the users assigned to R other than R.
Since the roles are non overlapping. Then, P = ;.
Consequently, \
Ui2assigned users(R) assigned perms(U i ) = R, and R satisfies the condition of Theorem 5.
Thus, if Algorithm 1 does not find an exact matching DNF for a given role in a context of role mining, this means that the conditions of Theorem 5 or Corollary 1 are not filled, and can be interpreted as a possible misconfiguration of that role in its original set of roles. The first possibility is that the Userto-Role assignment is incomplete, and that this role has not been assigned to any user yet. For instance, a job position has been created but the assigned employees are not hired yet. The second possibility is that the role is always assigned to the users simultaneously with another role, so the two roles can be merged in a single role. Another possibility is that the role is overlapping with other roles in the set, and some permissions of the role are shadowed by other roles. This can happen if the role is always assigned to users who receive the shadowed permissions from their other assigned roles simultaneously. The shared permissions can thus underline a misconfiguration of the role or a non optimal hierarchy in the structure of roles. To summarize, when used to compare two sets of equivalent roles, Algorithm 1 can warn about shadowed roles in the configuration of roles when an exact matching DNF for a certain role is not found.
But, the conditions of Theorem 5 or Corollary 1 are still restrictive, and they do not exhaustively specify when exact matching DNFS exists. For instance, they can not tell about overlapping roles. Besides Algorithm 1 can not exhaustively detect all the shadowed roles. Indeed, if the conditions are satisfied, then the algorithm will find exact matching DNFs for the roles, but if the Algorithm finds an exact matching DNFs this does not mean that the conditions are satisfied by the role. There may be still some undetected shadowed roles. Moreover, the detection of shadowed roles with Algorithm 1 is very costly in time. And the algorithm cannot tell if the role is entirely or partially shadowed. It would be more interesting to detect shadowed roles separately from the comparison algorithm, and then, handle the misconfiguration cause or discard the shadowed roles from their configuration, before comparing it with another configuration of roles. This would enhance the e ciency of the comparison algorithm. Besides, independently from the comparison of roles, exploring the shadowed roles in a given configuration of roles could be a useful application for a security administrator. For all these reasons, we now show how to handle the shadowing problem separately from the role set comparison problem.
Definition of Shadowed Roles
Towards handling the problem of shadowed roles detection, we have first to provide our formal definition of shadowed roles in a given role based access control configuration. Definition 8. Shadowed Role A role R is shadowed in a given RBAC configuration RC = (ROLES, UR, RP ) if it matches one or several of the following cases:
1. R is not assigned to any user in UR: i.e. assigned users(R) = ;. or 2. There exists (at least) another role R 0 in ROLES that has always similar user assignment as R: i.e. assigned users(R) = assigned users(R'). or 3. R is overlapping with one or several roles in ROLES, and there exists (at least) a permission p 2 assigned perms(R) such that the users assigned to R have always p in their other assigned roles.
The idea behind Definition 8 is that a role is considered as shadowed in a given access control configuration if we cannot find it in the user-to-permission assignment relation UPA. Typically, a role mining algorithm is not likely to calculate such a role since it is based on the UPA relation to extract the roles. The first case of shadowing is when the role has not been assigned to any user. The second case of shadowing is when the role is always assigned together with another role, which may indicate that it may be merged with another role. Finally, the third case of shadowing may occur only in RBAC configuration with overlapping roles. Di↵erent roles may share a subset of permissions. Shadowing happens when one or several permissions of a given role are never assigned to a user who is not already assigned these permission through his other roles. In this case, removing the permission from the role will not a↵ect the UPA relation. An example of this situation is provided in the Table1(a) of the afore presented motivation example. The permission p2 is shared by the roles r1 and r3. However, the role r3 is never assigned to a user who has not also the role r1. So the permission p2 is actually shadowed in role r3.
Shadowed Roles Detection Algorithm
We define a new algorithm that examines an RBAC configuration and detects the shadowed roles.
Algorithm 4 takes as input the matrices of user-to-role assignment UserRole and role-to-permission assignment RolePermission of an RBAC configuration. We Consider that a role is characterized by the set of permissions assigned to it, since the user-to-roles assignment is more dynamic and changes more often. The set of roles is then the raws of the matrix RolePermission. The algorithm checks the roles in the RolePermission matrix for the three cases of shadowing presented in Definition 8 and reports for each role if it is shadowed or not. For partially shadowed roles, the algorithm also reports which are the a↵ected permissions.
First of all, Algorithm 4 calls the function Check For Partitions Of Roles (line 1). This function checks all the roles of the configuration for the second case of shadowing stated in Definition 8. It detects the roles with similar sets of assigned users. These roles are partitions of a larger role. Each column in Algorithm 4 Detect Shadowed Roles(UserRole, RolePermission) Input: UserRole: a user to role assignment matrix Input: RolePermission: a role to permission assignment matrix Output: A specification for each role in UserRole matrix: whether it is "not shadowed", "not assigned", or "shadowed" with the specification of the "shadowed permissions". for each role R in CandidateRoles do 6: RIsShadowed False
7:
ShadowedPerms {}
8:
if assigned users( R ) 6 = ; then
9:
Report: "The role <R> is not assigned to any user."
10:
ProblematicPerms assigned perms(R) \ RecurrentPerms
12:
for each permission p in ProblematicPerms do
13:
OnceUsers assigned users( R ) \ assigned users only once( p) 14: if OnceUsers == ; then if RIsShadowed then
20:
Report: "The role <R> is shadowed. The shadowed permissions are <ShadowedPerms>."
21:
else
22:
Report: "The role <R> is not shadowed." for each role R in CandidateRoles do
28:
29:
Report: "The role <R> is not assigned to any user." Report: "The role <R> is not shadowed." The CandidateRoles may be totally shadowed if they are not assigned to any user, and this is easy to check. By contrast, the third case of shadowing, is more complex to be verified because a role may be partially shadowed by one or several roles. Only overlapping roles are potentially a↵ected by this case. The partially shadowed roles involve necessarily overlapping roles that have been assigned simultaneously to a set of users. Consequently, a subset of permissions are assigned multiple times to the same users. This is why we use the algebraic multiplication instead of the boolean multiplication traditionally used in role mining issues: the algebraic multiplication gives how many times the same permission has been assigned to a user. We calculate the non boolean user to permission assignment matrix NBUPA (line 2). In this matrix, each column represents a permission, each row represents a user, and the cell c ij represents how many times the permissions p j has been assigned to the user u i . Then, from this new matrix NBUPA, we deduce the set RecurrentPerms (line 3) that contains the permissions that have been assigned to a user, through more than one role. This set represents the only potentially shadowed permissions.
If the set RecurrentPerms is empty, then there exist no overlapping roles assigned simultaneously to the users, and consequently, there are no roles affected by the third case of shadowing in the Definition 8. We move to lines 26 to 34 where we check if each role has been assigned at least to a user. If RecurrentPerms is not empty (line 8), then there are overlapping roles which are assigned together to users in the input RBAC configuration. So there is a risk of partially shadowed roles. Algorithm 4 handles the CandidateRoles one by one in the for loop in line 5. First, it checks if the role has been assigned at least to a user. The algorithm simply looks at the column correspondent to the role in the UserRole matrix to get the assigned users(R). If the column is null, then the role is not assigned to, and is considered shadowed and we move to the next role. If there is a non null value in this column the role is assigned to one or several users, and we need to check if some of the assigned permissions(R) are shadowed. We have to handle the permissions assigned to the current role one by one to ensure that each permission has been assigned at least to one user only from the role R. This proves that the permission is not shadowed in the role. The role is not shadowed only if all its permissions assigned to R are not shadowed in it. Otherwise, the role is shadowed, and the current permission is one of the shadowed permissions. But hopefully, we do not need to check all the permissions assigned to a role since only the set of RecurrentPerms are potentially shadowed permissions. So, for each role R, we calculate the intersection between its assigned roles(R) and the RecurrentPerms, and we call it the ProblematicPerms (line 11). Finally, for each problematic permission, we calculate the intersection between the set of users assigned to the role, and the set of the users to whom the permission has been assigned from only one role, which we can find directly in the matrix NBUPA (see line 13) . If the set is empty then the role is shadowed, and we add this permission to the set of ShadowedPerms in the current role, before we move to exploring the remaining permissions in ProblematicPerms, to get the exhaustive set of shadowed permissions in this role. Otherwise, the current permission is not shadowed in this role, and the algorithm continues testing the other roles in ProblematicPerms. The role is reported to be unshadowed only if all the ProblematicPerms are not shadowed in it.
Theorem 6. Completeness. Given two matrices UR and RP ; For any role R from RP , if R fills one or several of the shadowing cases specified in Definition 8 then Algorithm 4 will report it as a shadowed role.
Proof. The function Check For Partitions Of Roles (Algorithm5) checks all the roles for the case 2 of shadowing. All the roles that are not in the case 2 of shadowing are set to CandidateRoles. In Algorithm 4, all the CandidateRoles are checked for the case of shadowing, either in the for loop (lines 5 to 9) if the roles are overlapping or in the for loop (lines 27 to 30) if the roles are not overlapping. The case 3 of shadowing is possible only in overlapping configurations of roles, and only overlapping roles are assigned together to the same users. Then, the If condition (line 8) ensures that all the CandidateRoles are checked for this case of shadowing only if there exist permissions assigned more than once to a user. These roles that are not concerned with the case 1 of shadowing are tested for the case 3 of shadowing. For each of these roles, the algorithm verifies that each permission of the role has been assigned at least once to a user whose other roles does not grant this permission. Otherwise the role is reported to be shadowed.
Time Complexity. Algorithm 4 is a light application that permits to detect and report the shadowed roles in a given RBAC configuration. Its time complexity is polynomial since it is O(n⇥m⇥k) with n the number of users, m the number of permissions and k the number of roles in the input RBAC configuration. We are much far from the exponential complexity of Algorithm 1. Moreover, we can avoid the worst case complexity of Algorithm 1 if we preprocess its input with Algorithm 4.
Experimental Results
RBAC State Generator
We have implemented a random RBAC configuration generator to obtain the synthetic data input for our experiments. This tool takes as input the characteristics of an RBAC configuration, notably the number of users, the number of permissions and the number of roles. In addition, it uses two parameters: the density of the user-role relation UR, and the density of the role-permission relation RP . The outputs are the three boolean matrices UR, RP , and UPA where UPA = UR ⌦ RP . The matrices UR and RP are randomly generated based on the provided densities which determine the probability to get 1 in a particular cell. The obtained configuration may contain partially overlapping roles, and may assign multiples roles to a user. We have implemented the plateform of test in MATLAB R2011a. All the experiments have been made with a 2.26 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor on Mac OS X V 10.7.2.
Experiment with the Role Set Comparison Algorithm
For this section, we generate eight data sets with di↵erent sizes described in Table 3 with the density parameter set to 0.1. The results of the experiments are summarized in Figure 1 . n nUsers nPerms nOR  1  10  15  4  2  18  25  8  3  25  30  12  4  35  40  16  5  200  350  20  6  400  500  30  7  500  800  40  8  600  1000  50 First, we use the data sets 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Table 3 for role mining tests. We provide the UPA matrix of each data set as input to a given role mining algorithm, and we compare the original roles in UR with the mined roles in UR ⇤ using the Algorithm 1. We test three di↵erent role mining algorithms. We adapt two techniques of matrix compression usually used in data mining, namely the Non Negative Matrix Factorization (NNMF) [16] and the Binary Non-Orthogonal Decomposition (BNOF) [17] . Both techniques take an UPA matrix from a data set and give an approximate decomposition of the matrix into the product of two matrices of lower rank, namely UR and RP . This is done by emphasizing the frequent patterns in the original matrix, which can be interpreted as roles in the context of role mining. However, the two techniques di↵er in their constraints and optimization objective. NNMF gives a factorization into two matrices of non negative integers, while minimizing the root-mean-squared. We transform the obtained positive matrices into boolean matrices. BNOF uses another decomposition technique which gives a boolean decomposition of overlapping roles, but a user can be assigned to only one role. The results of this first series of tests with NNMF and BNOF are given in Figure 1 (a) and (b). The purpose is to observe the behavior of Algorithm 1 when comparing two sets of roles which have been configured with di↵erent objectives. All role mining processes presented in this paper have finished without approximation errors. The number of original roles rise from 4 to 16, but the number of mined roles with NNMF and BNOF is slightly di↵erent from the number of original roles. In Figure 1 (a), we plot the execution time of Algorithm 1 in function of the number of mined roles because, as stated in the section 5.4, the complexity of the algorithm mainly depends on this latter parameter. The execution time increases with the number of mined roles. Besides, the curve of the role mined with BNOF shows an exponential increase in the fourth data set (19 mined roles, 253 s). This is because there is an original role for which no exact DNF can be calculated. This role is shadowed in the original configuration of roles. Thus, Algorithm 1 reaches the worst complexity case for this data set. The execution time does not only depend on the number of mined roles, but it is mostly dependent of the nature of the compared roles and how similar they are. In Figure 1 (b), we plot the average size of the obtained DNFs for each data set. By size of DNF we mean here the number of involved roles, no matter if in conjunctive or disjunctive clauses. The figure shows that the average size of the DNFs also increases with the number of mined roles. We notice a correlation between the size of the DNFs and the execution time. In particular, the execution time grows with the maximum number of conjunctions in the DNFs, which increases from one to three in this series of tests.
The third role mining algorithm we use is a Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) algorithm [18] . Considering the users as objects, and the permissions as their attributes, FCA calculates a lattice of all the possible formal concepts. We consider each Formal concept as a mined role. Role Mining algorithms in literature usually process to a pruning of the lattice to discard a subset of the concepts with regard to some optimization criteria, but in this paper, we keep all the concepts. This explains the high number of mined roles increasing from 7 to 123 in Figure 1 (c) and (d), corresponding to sets of original roles of only 4 to 16 roles. Our purpose is to test the ability of Algorithm 1 to compare a hierarchical configuration of roles with a flat configuration of roles. We aim also at testing the scalability of Algorithm 1 in such cases. The results in Figure 1 (c) and (d) show that the algorithm execution time scales well with the number of mined roles, where all the roles can match their exact DNFs. This is also explained by the fact that the average size of the obtained DNFs is still between 1 and 2, meaning that Algorithm 1 succeeds in matching the original roles with the appropriate roles in the hierarchical configuration of roles. Actually, the size of the DNFs varies between 1 to 6, and the number of conjunctions does not exceed three roles, which is an intelligible amount of data that can be managed by a security administrator.
Finally, we use the remaining last four sets of data in Table 3 , to test the ability of Algorithm 1 to perform a user to role assignment. We provide as input both the UPA (which may be considered as pseudo-roles as explained previously), and the set of roles generated by the random generator. The results are given in Figure 1 (e) and (f). Figure 1 (e) shows that the algorithm scales well with large data sets, since the execution time does not exceed 9 seconds. All the users are assigned to their appropriate roles, and the average size of the DNFs presented in Figure 1 (f) going up to 11 roles is simply the average number of roles assigned to each user, since no conjunctions has been involved in the generated DNFs in all the four tests.
Experiments with the Shadowed Roles Detection Algorithm
To test the Shadowed Role detection tool described in Algorithm 4, we have generated a set of RBAC configurations. The sizes of these configurations are presented in Table 4 . For each size, we have generated a series of RBAC configuration with di↵erent values of the density parameter, namely: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7. Figure 2 summarizes the results from these experiments. In Figure 2 (a), we show the execution time of the algorithm with each of the data size in function of the number of roles in the RBAC configuration. We see that the execution time increases with the number of roles, but it is still low (few seconds) even in the higher case of 800 Roles. In real application, the number of roles is not executed to exceed one thousand. Moreover, since we have generated sets of roles with similar sizes but di↵erent densities, we can notice in Figure 2 (a) that the execution time is higher for sets of roles with higher density. By increasing the density, the number of shadowed roles increases in the configuration, especially the number of partially shadowed roles. The random decision of the generator in the assignment of the permissions to the roles is likely to result in more misconfiguration of roles than in real configurations. Algorithm 4 is sensitive to the existence of overlapping roles because it performs an additional processing in this case (see Algorithm 4 -line 8). Figure 2 (b) presents the number of shadowed roles detected by the Algorithm 4, and confirms that the number of shadowed roles increases when the density increases.
Conclusion
Despite the importance of RBAC systems in today organizations, security administrators still lack for automated tools to assist them in the tasks related to the evaluation and management of roles. Such tasks are very sensitive for the security of the organization system, and it is hard and risky to handle them manually. In this paper, we have addressed two important issues related to role management. First, we have focused on the comparison of two configurations of roles, which is an important issue in the research and the application of Role Based Access Control, particularly with the accession of the role mining techniques. In this paper, we have provided a formal approach to handle the problem of comparing two sets of roles. We have stated the Role Set Comparison Problem (RSCP) as the problem of finding for each role in one set an expression of a disjunctive normal form of roles from the other set. We have demonstrated that RSCP is NP-complete. Afterwards, we have presented a greedy algorithm which solves it. We have proved the correctness and the completeness of the comparison algorithm. We have evaluated the time complexity of our algorithm. Finally, we have presented some experimental results which validate the e ciency of our algorithm in comparing configurations of roles defined with di↵erent criteria, such as structured and non structured hierarchies of roles. We have also tested the algorithm skills in deploying an RBAC policy by assigning the mined roles to the users.
Second, we are interested in the problem of detecting shadowed roles in an RBAC configuration. Shadowing is usually due to a misconfiguration of roles. We have formally defined the shadowing cases. We have provided a solution to detect shadowed roles. And, we have formally linked the problem of shadowed roles to the problem of comparing sets of roles. Indeed, in most cases related to role mining, preprocessing the compared sets of roles by eliminating shadowing from the set of roles significantly lowers the complexity of the RSCP solution.
We have finally presented the experimental results that show the e ciency and the scalability of the shadowing detection solution. As perspective of this work, we plan to integrate these algorithms in RBAC administration tools.
